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Abstract 
Decades ago Johan Galtung presented his perspective on violence which includes 
the distinction between structural, direct and cultural violence. This paper tries to 
incorporate his approach and present the connection between structural violence 
and migrations with focus on immigration in the EU. The author argues that the 
consequence of structural violence is the appearance of two types of excluded 
spaces: a) global total institutions, which include countries or entire regions of 
economically less or underdeveloped countries; b) local total institutions within 
the economically developed countries, which include physical spaces (immigrant 
neighbourhoods, ghettos, prisons, detention centers for foreigners, etc.) and also 
social spaces of exclusion in which immigrants are put due to stereotype, 
prejudice and consequential discrimination. 
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要旨 
数十年前、ヨハン・ガルトゥングは構造的、直接的、文化的な暴力の違い
を含む暴力についての見解を示した。本稿ではその視角を取り入れながら、
ＥＵ内の移民政策に焦点を当て構造的暴力と移住の関係について述べたい。
構造的暴力とは、以下の２つのタイプの排除された空間の出現であると考
えられる。a）経済的に遅れている国や発展途上国などを含むグローバル
な空間の出現。b）物理的な空間を含む経済先進国内の地域空間（移民地
域、ゲットー、刑務所、外国人拘留センターなど）や固定観念による先入
観や差別を受け移民が排除される社会的空間の出現。 
 
キーワード：移住、構造上の暴力、慣習、移民、社会的排他性 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sociological and criminological analyses of violence are often limited to the 
forms of violence we have learned to recognize the easiest, i.e. (direct) physical 
violence. Some authors extend this aspect to other forms (e.g. psychological 
violence, economic violence), though only a few present a broader perspective 
which looks ‘behind the scenes’ and who understand that violence is present in 
those forms, processes and functioning of structures that we often take for granted 
and see as universally acceptable and part of regular everyday practice. One of the 
most important approaches, which provides an alternative and expanded perception 
of violence and allows us to overcome ideological blindness is Galtung’s typology 
of violence and his distinction between direct and structural violence. Galtung 
(1990: 292) understands violence, both structural and direct, as “avoidable insults 
to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs 
satisfaction below what is potentially possible.” Violence is an attack on basic 
human needs and reduces the possibility of satisfying these needs below the level 
that would be achieved by an individual if this violent act had not happened.1 
 
In explaining the distinction between structural and direct violence, Galtung 
(1969: 170-171) concludes that direct violence includes recognizable perpetrators 
of violence, while structural violence does not have such an agent. In this case the 
violence is integrated in the structure and is manifested as “unequal power and 
consequently as unequal life chances” (ibid.: 171). “Direct violence is an event; 
structural violence is a process” (Galtung 1990: 294). The former refers to acts 
committed by persons, perpetrators, and the latter to cases where though the 
offender is in the end also a person, his/her guilt extends his/her responsibility 
(but this does not give him/her absolute immunity from individual responsibility). 
In this case the perpetrator is merely a tool of the entire system or structure. We 
can recognise Galtung’s influence on Žižek (2008) – his triangle of violence 
consists of the division of the subjective, symbolic and systematic violence - who 
concludes that systemic violence cannot be attributed to specific individuals and 
their evil intentions as this violence is purely objective, systemic, and anonymous. 
Žižek (2008: 12-11) sees (or to be precise opens the question) that there is 
something suspicious and quite symptomatic in the unbelievable obsession of  
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today’s tolerant liberal societies in opposing all forms of subjective violence (in 
Galtung’s words direct violence) as they desperately try to divert attention from 
the real problems of other forms of violence. 
 
Nowadays we are more and more sensitive to all visible, clear, easily identifiable 
and tangible threats and acts of violence, we take a firm stand against them, 
though on the other hand all invisible threats and risks (which present a bigger 
danger) are tolerated, accepted, endorsed, advocated, defended, and even more, in 
the performance of which we willingly cooperate. It is generally acceptable and 
expected that we condemn killings, rape, robberies and all other socially 
disruptive and unacceptable phenomena. We expect and demand that institutions 
with power take action and punish perpetrators of such acts. To be precise, people 
demand even stricter and harsher punishments, regardless of their inefficiency in 
crime prevention and reduction (Pratt 2007). At the same time, we accept, 
condone, support and participate in the actions of a malignant system which 
legalizes violence, mass casualties and deaths (e.g. we only need to look at how 
the EU treats refugees who cross the Mediterranean Sea and expose their lives in 
those dangerous voyages where they have to flee from war and misery). We 
support cruel structural violence and its consequences with a variety of 
humanitarian actions and assistance. We help, though we do not recognize that the 
same mechanism that creates the need for our assistance also victimizes us. We 
support and learn to realize the maximization of profit at any price which leads to 
the exploitation of the less developed regions and people ‘there’ as well as people 
from the lower social strata ‘here’. The system activates the same mechanisms for 
the implementation of its direct violence and repression ‘here’ and ‘there’. Local 
(national) victimization is caused by the application of global ideology to the local 
(national) level. Structural violence counts on existential dependence and hence 
support of people who are (ironically) most easily recruited among the victimized 
internals. With the help of the ideological state apparatus they internalize 
nationalism and racism, which under the guise of patriotism, convinces them that 
they are defending their country against the exploiters of benefits. They believe 
this represents the right way to defend the homeland, order and peace, and 
therefore they have to fight terrorism, oppose immigrants and refugees, yet at the 
same time they overlook the fact that they are the victims of structural violence 
and become the frontline soldiers of the exploitive system. 
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2. Research methods and research questions  
 
In this paper, I will focus on the correlation between structural violence and 
migration. Structural violence is understood in Galtung’s perspective as policies and 
social practices – both are realized in society through formal and informal 
structures (institutions) – which enable, legalize and normalize illegitimate and 
unfair acts that knowingly seriously harm others. The definition of international 
migrations accepted in this paper is influenced by UNESCO’s definition presented 
in The Glossary of Migration Related Terms (UNESCO 2015) and explains 
international migrations as “territorial relocation of people between nation-states”. 
However, specific forms of relocation are excluded from this definition, i.e. 
territorial movements between states which do not result in any change in social 
ties and therefore remain largely inconsequential both for the individual and the 
societies of origin and destination. The clearest example of such exclusion from 
the definition is tourism (ibid.).   
 
Research questions to which I seek answers are: Is there an interconnection 
between international migrations and structural violence? What are the forms of 
this connection and what are their consequences? Is it possible to recognize them 
on global, regional, national and local levels? In a search for answers to these 
questions, I used the literature review method and analysis of selected legislation 
relating to immigration policy in the European Union. Special focus is put on the 
analysis of social conditions and relations between immigrants, their offspring and 
the local population.   
 
3. Structural violence and migration  
 
The link between structural violence (and its consequences) and migration can be 
recognized in cases where the structural and consequential direct violence represents 
a cause for migration. Castles (2003: 14-23) and Delgado Wise (2009: 767-784) 
showed various problems caused by economic globalization and economic 
imperialism, and its connection with forced migrations. Castles (2003) argues that 
although it may be relatively easy to identify the impact of globalization on 
economic migration, it is harder to recognise its impact on forced migration. 
However, it undoubtedly exists. Post-industrial Western countries have a dominant 
role in the globalization process which guarantees them power and protects their 
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economic and political interests. Despite the formal abolition of colonialism, 
dominance still exists in the guise of neo-colonialism. Although many poorer 
countries on the periphery enjoy de jure sovereignty, they are de facto subordinate 
to the interests of large, economically powerful countries, or to be precise the elites 
in these countries, which are becoming more and more transnational. To promote 
their interests, Western countries skilfully use soft political power of international 
financial and political institutions under the domination of the West (the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization). However, 
the consequences of these actions are no less devastating then direct violence.  
 
Economic globalization represents the political tool – the mechanism of structural 
violence – of Western countries and more precisely of the transnational capitalist 
elites (Beck 2000; Chomsky 2005; Delgado Wise 2009; Stiglitz 2006; Wallerstein 
2006 et al.). Although it cannot be overlooked that when all political means fail to 
bring results, they can be upgraded by the use of hard power in the form of 
blockades, isolation and even military intervention. As Wallerstein (2006: 28) 
puts it, although we are scandalized when we learn of it, there still exists much 
plunder in the modern world-system. Western countries import everything they 
need for their development and profit from the periphery ranging from raw 
materials to people (workers). On the other hand, they export back everything 
they do not need or what benefits their interests, or even more ironically, what 
benefits the interests of the transnational (non-state, private) big businesses. This 
also means exporting neoliberal policies with the idea of a (selectively) free 
market and the movement of capital, low-paid work, protective economic policies 
in the form of patents, quotas, restrictions on migration movement, hazardous 
industry and hazardous wastes etc. When ‘importing’ workers, (which are reduced 
to the pure level of the work force) economically developed countries are, of 
course, selective. They allow and encourage the arrival of desirable and necessary 
workers who possess economic or cultural capital (knowledge, experience), and 
when there is a need for unskilled workers they also encourage their immigration. 
Though, at the same time they try hard to keep all the unwanted and unneeded on 
the other side of the wall of the Western fortresses. A key role in the management 
of these processes is the comprehensive system of migration control, in which 
national borders function like a membrane, allowing global flow, while keeping 
the unwanted out (Franko Aas 2007: 33). 
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Globalization has led to changes in the treatment of “global human waste”.2  
Now we need to look for “local solutions to globally produced problems” 
(Bauman 2005: 92). Modernization, technological and economic development 
have created a waste population in those parts of the world which were until 
recently the target destination for the export of Western human waste. The 
response of post-industrialized countries to these changing circumstances and 
growing waste population at home and around the world – we can also call it local 
responses to global problems – is the implementation of repressive mechanisms of 
exclusion. Bauman (2005: 97) argues that responses include stricter segregationist 
policies and new extraordinary security measures. They are presented as 
necessary measures in the fight (war) for a healthy society and normal functioning 
of the social system. Since the waste populations from home (here) can no longer 
be exported elsewhere (there) and in addition in the meantime new global waste 
populations have emerged, the local solution to this problem in the West is the 
design of new forms of isolation and exclusion. As Bauman (ibid.: 98) puts it, 
“since the human waste can no longer be removed to distant waste-disposal sites 
/…/ it needs to be sealed off in tightly closed containers”.  
 
One of the characteristics of present global conditions is the appearance of two 
types of zones of confined space. They exist ‘there’, outside the post-industrial 
economically developed parts of the world, and include entire countries, regions 
and even continents. At the same time they are also present ‘here’, within the 
so-called first world. We can see them in the form of closed areas such as ghettos, 
slums or similar excluded settlements, prisons and detention centres for illegal 
immigrants. Residents of these areas are excluded from basic achievements of 
civilization. They have limited or no chances of obtaining adequate education, 
employment, health care, social security, personal security and, consequently, in 
many cases pure survival. These two forms of confined spaces resemble Goffman’s 
(1961) total institutions. He defines them as:  
 
…a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated 
individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, 
together lead  an enclosed, formally administered round of life (ibid.: xii). 
 
 
 
 Structural Violence and Migration: Explaining Global and Local Total Institutions 
 
 − 43 − 
In addition, he describes their appearance with the following words: 
 
Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to 
social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right 
into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, 
water, forests, or moors (ibid.: 4). 
 
Similarity between total institutions and the consequences of immigration policies 
of economically developed countries can be seen in the emergence of firstly, 
global total institutions, which include countries or entire regions of economically 
less or underdeveloped countries. The majority of the population of these countries 
is locked in by immigration rules. They cannot leave their regions and enter 
economically developed countries, at least not legally. Secondly, local total 
institutions within the economically developed countries, which include physical 
spaces such as immigrant neighbourhoods, ghettos, prisons, detention centers for 
foreigners, as well as social spaces of exclusion in which immigrants are put due 
to discrimination and stereotype. It has to be stressed that the connection between 
migration, immigration policies and total institutions must not be understood as an 
actual and literal overlapping, though we can see a high correlation among 
conditions and processes in total institutions (prisons, psychiatric hospitals, 
concentration camps, etc.) and global and internal places of exclusion. The 
clearest similarity can be seen in identical mechanisms and processes that divide 
‘our’ place from ‘theirs’ and separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. Locked doors, high fences, 
barbed wire and corresponding procedures described by Goffman, could also refer 
to the description of the border between the Spanish enclave of Melilla in North 
Africa and Morocco, parts of the border between Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria 
and Turkey, new fences between Hungary and Serbia, the border between the US 
and Mexico, detention centers for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, the 
control of ships and turning of or even towing of boats back out to sea by the 
Australian navy, etc. The similarity between Goffman's total institution and places 
of exclusion is not only visual. What is more important is that they have an 
identical purpose. Their mission is the containment of undesirable people in specific 
areas. They keep ‘them’ away from ‘us’ by preventing ‘them’ to leave these 
isolated, locked and separated spaces – total institutions.  
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4. Global total institutions 
 
The system of panoptic surveillance of migration and the exclusionist immigration 
policies of Western countries exclude entire regions and their populations. 
Western fortresses have established electronic, physical, social and economic 
borders and use protective zones abroad for the management of migrations. They 
separate our world from theirs, and by this means create vast total institutions in 
‘their’ world. People are locked in them and not allowed to leave places of misery, 
poverty, unemployment and existential threat. These are conditions which are in 
many cases co-created by western exploitative economic policies. Most of the 
people in global total institutions live in similar situations. They are not separated 
from their community, though they are detached from opportunities to develop 
their potential and often even possibilities to ensure survival. Their chances of 
legal immigration in the developed world depend primarily on economic and 
cultural capital. Gates that close people in global total institutions are selectively 
closed. They allow, encourage and even welcome the immigration of people with 
economic capital, and people with needed cultural capital (e.g. specialists of 
certain professions), though unskilled workers are allowed in occasionally, if there 
is a demand for them on the labour market. In Goffman’s words, some of the 
“inmates” of global total institutions are privileged and allowed to engage in global 
migration. This proves that the exclusionist policies and locking of people in the 
global total institutions is not linked solely to a physical space (country of origin), but 
complemented by social and economic criteria. This argument can be supported by 
Bauman’s (2008: 9) conclusion, that mobility has become the strongest stratification 
factor that determines the social, political, economic and cultural hierarchy. 
 
Global mobility of socially deprived groups (classes) of population in global total 
institutions is limited by selective immigration policies (visas and other legal 
boundaries) and also by economic and social capital. Castles and Miller (2009: 56) 
conclude that international migrations (regular and irregular) are selective, 
because they include only people who have (at least minimal) financial resources 
to cover the travel costs and social capital which enables them to connect with 
opportunities abroad. Regarding this, it is obvious that the poorest people do not 
even have the possibility to leave the global total institutions and are condemned 
to live in poverty and existential threat. Their lives are marked by war and other 
conflicts, corruption, violence of local war lords who are supported by the 
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economically developed countries and transnational corporations (e.g. see UN 
OHCHR 2010 report for the connection between the trade with minerals and 
timber and violent conflict in the Congo), natural disasters (drought, floods), 
industrial destruction of the environment, negative effects of structural economic 
adjustments, etc. People who cannot afford international migration try to improve 
their lives by internal migrations to the outskirts of nearby bigger cities, where 
they frequently end up in slums and become a double-excluded population; “the 
waste of the waste population”.3 
 
By keeping people in the global total institution, Western countries and 
transnational corporations set up their own global reserve army of labour which 
can be mobilised when needed. How this reserve army is included depends on 
which services and goods are produced. There is a difference between nomadic 
goods and services which can cross borders and take place in different territories, 
or sedentary, which take place in a single territory and stay locked within 
domestic borders (Giraud 2006: 41). In the case of the former the reserve army of 
labour is used in the global total institutions; ever since the 1970s labour-intensive 
activities migrated to the area of technologically advanced countries with low 
wages. The use of this strategy enables corporations to lower the costs of 
production and at the same time also puts pressure on domestic workers who are 
forced to accept a decrease in their standard (for more, see Beck 2000). As a result 
of this, over the last decades, we are witnessing the continuous disappearance of 
nomad jobs in Europe and the United States. This has forced millions of people 
into sedentary activities, mostly in low paid service jobs, and at the same time 
many of the richest nomads who exploited this global situation have increased 
their wealth (Giraud 2012). A reserve army of labour is also included in sedentary 
sectors ‘here’, especially in the so-called 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, difficult), 
which traditionally employ immigrant workers (more on this in the following part 
of the paper). The described characteristics show that local problems can be 
solved only with action on the global level.   
 
An analysis of integration of globally excluded groups of people reveals that 
mobilization of the global reserve army of labour does not include all parts of the 
waste population in the global total institutions. Those at the bottom, who 
represent the double-excluded population, (“the waste of the waste population”) 
are totally excluded and condemned to misery. Davis (2006: 200) argues “there is 
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no official scenario for the reincorporation of this vast mass of surplus labour into 
the mainstream of the world economy.” Global economic flows do not want to 
include them even in their exploitation. This is the dominant social, political and 
economic spirit which influences the policy making process, thus it is not hard to 
understand the EU restrictions in asylum policy and avoidance in receiving 
refugees. Events and reactions of EU countries after the increase in the number of 
refugees in the spring and summer of 2015 are a clear demonstration of such 
avoidance of the double-excluded population. Conditions in periphery countries 
(economic devastation, war, political violence, etc.) force people to leave their 
homes – or to use the terminology of total institutions – escape from global total 
institutions. More people are coming to EU countries than needed by the local 
economy and they are far from welcomed. Regardless of the situation in their home 
countries, they are expected not to run away from their global total institutions. 
 
5. Local total institutions 
 
An important feature of the postmodern world is the existence of two conflicting 
groups of people within individual countries: the group of excluded and the group 
of included. Western post-industrial countries are no exception. Even in the 
economically most developed countries we can find neighbourhoods with 
excluded and marginalized groups of the population; and vice versa, even the 
poorest countries include elite neighbourhoods and protected areas for tourists, etc. 
Young (1999: 19-20) concludes that inside European nations there are two worlds: 
the central core and the out-group, though there is an additional specific sanitary 
cordon in-between the two. The central core includes individuals with stable 
employment and career advancement, social security, access to health care, 
education, personal security, etc. However, the scope of this privileged group is 
rapidly shrinking.  
 
The out-group represent “the people that modernity has left behind, pockets of 
poverty and deprivation in the affluent society” (ibid. 20). After the Second World 
War, the main political and social agenda for decades included the idea that it is 
necessary to provide the inclusion of the marginalised and the excluded. However, 
with the rise and global dominance of neo-liberalism, this perspective has 
vanished. The excluded remain excluded, left to themselves and their ingenuity, 
which in the absence of legal chances of survival also leads to criminal activity. 
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The concern of the included and privileged is no longer how to include this group 
of people, but how to keep them excluded. Young argues that this out-group 
includes a high number of members of ethnic groups, which leads to 
‘scapegoating’ and confusing the correlation with causality – blaming the race and 
ethnicity instead of the social conditions. A common characteristic of western 
societies is the incarceration of socially marginalized groups and the criminalization 
of poverty. In the US victims of such policies are African-Americans, and in 
Europe immigrants and their descendants. Wacquant (2008: 104) understands this 
as the criminalization of immigrants, which is further inflamed by the media and 
some politicians who exploit the xenophobic sentiments of many European 
citizens. In situation, intensified by the decline of social rights of the domestic 
population and the fear of terrorism, the presentation of migration, crime, and 
even terrorism in public discourse is confused and shows minimal difference 
between these phenomena. Franko Aas (2007: 78) notes that political and media 
discourse of most Western countries includes the image of the “deviant 
immigrant”. This involves various forms of crime allegedly connected to 
immigration (violent asylum seekers, smugglers and traffickers, Muslim terrorists, 
Nigerian and East European prostitutes, gangs of youths of different ethnic 
descent, etc.). In other words, the boundary between migration and crime, 
migrants and criminals in public discourse is becoming increasingly blurred. 
Foreigners, immigrants and those who do not share the collective identity of the 
majority and who represent the ‘other’, represent a threat to ‘us’. Stereotyping of 
ethnic minorities has a significant impact on every day practices of social control 
(Franko Aas 2007: 83), and provides legitimacy for harsher and intense policing 
and control of immigrants and their offspring. The police tend to act reactively, 
they do not consider themselves to be at the service of the local citizenry but 
represent their warders (Young 1999: 51). 
 
In the past, many low-skilled migrant workers had a chance of slow progress to 
middle class. Today, this is becoming more and more difficult. And it is not just 
immigrants who are exposed to these changed conditions, but also a wide group of 
domestic workers. Bauman (2005: 52) notes that the need for labour will decrease, 
and the small proportion of the “old type” (fordistic) jobs will demand a temporary, 
highly flexible and on demand labour force. The position of domestic and 
immigrant workers is threatened by the same element – the global capitalist race 
in which competitors try to achieve the highest possible profits. One of the 
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commonly used measures in this match is a relocation of production to regions 
with low wages. It is obvious that workers’ rights are under attack, irrespective of 
their country of origin, nationality, and ethnicity. Ironically, most of them do not 
recognize this. Instead of realizing that immigrant and domestic workers share 
membership in the same social class, the proletariat, they are divided. The barrier 
between the two groups derives from minimal privileges of domestic workers, 
intense exploitation of immigrants and also from legal, political and social factors 
(discrimination, prejudice, etc.) (Castles 2000: 35). This leads to the formation of 
(internal) local total institutions within the post-industrialized countries. These 
are spaces of confinement inside the Western fortresses. They grasp the “local 
waste population” and exclude them from the common spaces and the majority. 
The most explicit forms of such institutions are ghettos and immigrant 
neighbourhoods. The list can be extended to prisons, where foreigners represent a 
high proportion of the population, detention centers for foreigners and asylum 
seekers, and housing facilities for migrant workers.  
 
Social and ethnic segregation in cities and their connection to migration were 
already analyzed by researchers of the Chicago School of Sociology at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Burgess (1925/1967) concluded that Chicago 
was divided into five areas, the so-called concentric rings. The worst conditions 
were in the transition zone, so-called slums, which represented (internal) local 
total institutions. They were characterised by poverty, deteriorating housing and 
poor living conditions, disease and crime. These were the areas where immigrants 
settled and created Jewish, Italian, Greek, Chinese quarters. The situation was 
better in each ring outwards from the center. When workers (including 
immigrants) improved their social situation, they moved from the slums to areas 
away from the center. Consequentially, the center hosted the poorest population 
and the area on the outskirts the middle class (for more, see Burgess 1925/1967). 
These findings suggest a link between the social situation and the place of residence 
and do not apply only to the American cities, but are confirmed also in Europe. 
Immigrant groups are concentrated in ethnic communities or in mixed immigrant 
neighbourhoods in urban centers. The UN-Habitat (2003: 2) report shows that the 
majority of (legal and irregular) immigrants settle in urban centers, close to their 
ethnic communities and their support network (family members, friends, 
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 acquaintances, etc.). They live in an environment characterised by their culture, 
access to religious places, shops, and most importantly they are welcomed in this 
environment, without doubts about their culture and prejudice from their neighbours. 
 
Described characteristics apply to the situation in France where the majority of 
immigrants are settled in neighbourhoods around large cities such as Paris, Lyon, 
and Marseille. The situation is only slightly different in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the UK, etc. (Bade 2005). Such conditions are a result of official 
housing and settlement policies which led to the concentration, and consequently 
the exclusion, of ethnic minorities and immigrants, as for example in the UK and 
Sweden (Castles, Miller 2009: 262); an inadequate housing policy that promotes 
private ownership of housing accessible only to the members of the privileged and 
included group. Excluded populations do not possess capital to purchase their own 
home and are forced to rent cheap and low quality housing facilities. This happened, 
for example, in Belgium, in Brussels (Dujardin, Selod, Thomas 2008: 89-113). 
Migrant workers initially planned to immigrate only for a limited period of time. 
However, after many years in another country, inclusion in the labour market and 
more or less successful integration into the host community, they decided to settle 
for longer. This was in their interest and also in the interest of their employers 
who did not want to let go of trained and skilled workers. Some years on they 
were re-unified with their families and this was usually the time when they left 
immigrant worker housing and moved to neighborhoods with low rents 
(Lucassen 2005: 186-187). 
 
The link between the place of residence and social status does not take place only 
in the direction where a social position determines the place of residence (as 
described above), but also vice versa. Various authors (e.g. Dujardin, Selod, 
Thomas 2008: 103; Korsu, Wenglenski 2010: 2, 298-2, 300) show, that a place of 
residence may impact on the social status of individuals or whole groups in the 
neighbourhood. Residence in a specific part of the city can cause stereotypical 
judgments which lead to discrimination of inhabitants of these neighbourhoods. 
They are in a disadvantaged position especially when seeking employment. In the 
analysis of unemployment in Paris, Korsu and Wenglenski (2010: 2, 300) conclude 
that the negative impact of residence in a poor neighbourhood has a stronger  
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influence on long-term unemployment than many other factors. The frequency of 
unemployment, lasting for more than one year, is, in the poorer districts, 70% 
higher than the average. In addition to the exclusion from the labour market, the 
inhabitants of these excluded areas – local total institutions – are also deprived 
and excluded in other fields, such as when applying for tenders, in need of the 
health care service, conducting business with banks and applying for credit, 
access to high quality education, and especially when dealing with institutions of 
formal social control. 
 
Places of exclusion, such as immigrant neighbourhoods, are more determined by 
social barriers than physical ones. Ethnicity, nationality and race have a similar 
influence on (un)successful participation in the labour market as residential area. In 
the UK, among the group of young people aged 16-24 years, 20.8% of unemployed 
are whites, 22.4% are mixed race, 26.7% Asians and 47.4% blacks. The difference 
is even greater when comparing young boys, where 23.9% of the unemployed are 
whites and 55.9% blacks (Office for National Statistics UK 2012). The situation is 
rather the same in France. French citizens born in France are less likely to be 
long-term unemployed than French citizens born abroad (Korsu, Wenglenski 
2010: 2, 299). In Belgium, young Belgian citizens whose parents are foreigners, 
are more likely to be unemployed than their peers whose parents were born in 
Belgium (Dujardin, Selod, Thomas 2008: 103). Nationality is obviously not the 
only measure of inclusion, since formal exclusion is also compounded by informal.  
 
The cycle of poverty, low education, and unemployment, which is the result of 
formal and social exclusion, makes it possible that ghettos lock and immobilize in 
their locality the “waste population” (Bauman 2004) and take on the role of local 
social dumpsite. Internal local total institutions separate people with specific 
borders. These appear in various forms, from symbolic, direct to physical. 
Symbolic borders, which separate local total institutions from the external world, 
can be seen in the form of rituals, specific dress styles, unusual or among the 
excluded population unacceptable and immoral behaviour, violation of rules, law 
and order, vandalism. The symbolic borders warn the individual, who is not an 
‘inmate’ of this total institution, that he has entered into a new, different space. 
Bauman (2008: 22) explains that residents in these neighbourhoods use aggressive  
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self-defense at the borders to put their symbols and signs which read “no entry”. 
They just follow new rules to fight for territory. Approaches used by the ‘excluded’ 
for marking their territory are not different from the ones used by the privileged 
elite of ‘included’. The clearest example of such actions of the latter is a design of 
so-called gated communities in which Franko Aas (2007: 70) sees the replication of 
fortified continents. They represent fortresses inside a fortress. Mechanisms and 
processes used to keep the unwanted outside are similar to those used by Western 
countries to keep the unneeded in global total institutions. They include everything 
from social exclusion with stereotype, prejudice and discrimination, to physical 
boundaries and technical control.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
International migration and structural violence are interconnected on the global 
and the local level. It is structural violence which creates two types of excluded 
areas which I call global and local total institutions. Western countries have 
established a system in which people are considered as pure objects of 
immigration control, and the immigration policy (generally) differentiates 
between wanted and unwanted immigrants – included and excluded population. 
Such an attitude is the direct reflection of broader social changes in recent decades. 
Their common denominator is the implementation of economic logic to all aspects 
of social life and the subordination of socio-political process to market principles. 
Changes in domestic social conditions, increasing pressure on the labour market, 
were accompanied by the spread of intolerance towards immigrants and all the 
‘unwanted’, ‘unneeded’ and ‘unnecessary’ by the mainstream political decision-
makers and the media. Marginalized groups easily become scapegoats for various 
problems and victims of generalization. The characteristics of individuals are lost 
in the stereotypes and prejudice about ‘the other’. The public demands strict 
control of borders, limitations in asylum and immigration policy. On rare 
occasions, usually after a tragedy with many casualties, there is minor discomfort 
and bitterness among all those responsible – including every politically passive 
individual in the western fortresses – but the very next moment they all support  
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and continue with the established practices. It does not matter if people are forced 
to leave their homes because of war, violence, famine and unsustainable living 
conditions. Under the labels of patriotism and fear for ‘our’ people, hide the simple 
facts that such people are seen as a “waste population” and are not welcome.  
 
In his profound analysis of the causes of the Holocaust, Bauman (2006: 21) 
concluded that the attitudes towards the Holocaust reveal key information about 
society. The same applies to post-modern societies and their attitudes towards 
immigrants, especially irregular migrants and refugees. In historical context and 
with the distance of time, we will see in the present dark episode and uncivilized 
attitudes towards the “waste population” a clear reflection of contemporary 
developed, civilized, democratic, tolerant, inclusive societies. Fortification of 
economically developed countries is illegitimate, especially because it is exactly 
these countries (to be precise their economic and political elites), who have 
significantly influenced conditions in the global total institutions. People who are 
forced to leave their homes are later victimized and even put into prison-like 
facilities (detention centres). Furthermore, in ‘defending’ the fortress, Europe 
cooperates with anyone who is willing to become a ‘partner in crime’. Former 
violations of democratic principles, human rights abuses, dictatorship, and support 
of terrorism are not an obstacle. The former cooperation of the EU in the 
management of migration (i.e. retention of migrants in North Africa) with the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya confirms this conclusion. There is incredible irony in the 
fact that a quarter of a century after the fall of the Iron Curtain new, similar fences 
have appeared at the borders of Europe and other economically developed countries.  
 
 
* This paper is based on the research programme Security and safety in local communities (P5-0397, 2015-
2018, financed by the Slovenian Research Agency) carried out by the Faculty of Criminal Justice and 
Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia. 
                                                
1 Galtung (1990: 292) divides needs into four categories: survival needs, well-being needs, identity needs and 
freedom needs. Harm can be a result of direct violence or structural violence in the form of an attack on 
these needs. Both can cause death, mutilation, suffering, hunger, imprisonment, ban on movement, denial of 
cultural expression, etc. (for more on this, see Galtung 1990: 167-191). 
2 Bauman (2005: 91-96) explains that the result of modernization and an inseparable companion of modernity 
is also a production of “human waste” or more precisely “wasted humans”. They represent the “excessive”, 
“superﬂuous”, “supernumerary”, “redundant” population for whom it was not possible, desirable or allowed 
to stay inside their countries. The emergence of such groups in the population of economically developed 
countries was the result of establishment of internal order (those who violated it, automatically became 
unwanted or waste) and economic and technological progress (old type workers became redundant and  
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waste). In the past, Western countries “solved” the problem of “human waste” by using “global solutions to 
local problems” (ibid.: 92), which in other words meant export and removal of unwanted “waste 
populations” to the new colonised territories. 
3 For more on this, see Davis (2006) Planet of Slums and UN-Habitat (2003) The Challenge of Slums - 
Global Report on Human Settlements 2003.  
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